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In this paper we adopt a new approach to testing for purchasing power parity, PPP, that is 
robust to base country effects, cross-section dependence, and aggregation. Given data on N +1 
countries, i, j = 0, 1, 2, ..., N, the standard procedure is to apply unit root or stationarity tests 
to N relative prices against a base country, 0, e.g. the US. The evidence is that such tests are 
sensitive to the choice of base country. In addition, the analysis is subject to a high degree of 
cross section dependence which is difficult to deal with particularly when N is large. In this 
paper we test for PPP applying a pairwise approach to the disaggregated data set recently 
analysed by Imbs, Mumtaz, Ravan and Rey (2005, QJE). We consider a variety of tests 
applied to all possible N(N +1)/2 pairs of real exchange rate pairs between the N + 1 countries 
and estimate the proportion of the pairs that are stationary, for the aggregates and each of the 
19 commodity groups. This approach is invariant to base country effects and the proportion 
that are non-stationary can be consistently estimated even if there is cross-sectional 
dependence. To deal with small sample problems and residual cross section dependence, we 
use a factor augmented sieve bootstrap approach and present bootstrap pairwise estimates of 
the proportions that are stationary. The bootstrapped rejection frequencies at 26%-49% based 
on unit root tests suggest some evidence in favour of the PPP in the case of the disaggregate 
data as compared to 6%-14% based on aggregate price series. 
JEL Code: C23, F31, F41. 
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In this paper we adopt a new approach to examining the purchasing power parity, PPP, hy-
pothesis that is robust to base country eﬀects, cross-section dependence and aggregation. Tests
for PPP usually involve examining the time series properties of relative prices in a common
currency to determine whether there is adjustment to equilibrium and, if so, to estimate the
adjustment speed. Given data on N +1countries, i,j =0 ,1,2,...,N, the standard procedure is
to construct the N relative prices against a base country, 0, e.g. the US. The evidence is that
the test results can be quite sensitive to the choice of base country. It could be that the real
exchange rate between a pair of countries was I(0), but both their rates against the US were
I(1). The fact that PPP held between this pair would be lost by just focussing on the relative
dollar prices. A closely related issue is that there are usually a high degree of dependence across
the diﬀerent relative prices, which may reﬂe c tt h eb a s ec o u n t r ye ﬀect or other common factors,
that are diﬃcult to eliminate. Neglect of the cross-section dependence has adverse eﬀects on
the properties of estimators and tests and can lead to misleading conclusions. There are also
issues of aggregation. Even if individual relative prices adjust quickly, aggregate price indices
may not adjust so quickly because the patterns of expenditures in the two countries are very
diﬀerent. In addition heterogeneity in the speeds of adjustment of the individual goods may bias
the aggregate or panel estimate of the speed of adjustment towards zero. Imbs, Mumtaz, Ravan
and Rey (2005, IMRR), document this heterogeneity bias and for comparability we use their
data, which covers 19 goods in 12 countries. We are grateful to them for making their data set
available to us.
In this paper we consider a variety of ADF type tests, which have the null hypothesis of
no adjustment, and the stationary tests due to Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (1992,
KPSS), which have the null of adjustment. We use both aggregate real exchange rates and 19
disaggregate relative prices for particular commodities. Following Pesaran (2005a), who applies
this pairwise approach to output and growth convergence, we consider tests using all possible
N(N +1 ) /2 pairs of real exchange rates, or relative prices, between the N +1countries and
estimate the proportion of the pairs that are stationary, for the aggregate and each commodity
group separately. This approach is clearly invariant to base country eﬀects and the proportion of
country pairs that are non-stationary is consistently estimated despite the cross section depen-
dence of the pairwise tests. To deal with sampling variation in the estimation of the proportions
and possible residual cross section dependence, we develop a factor augmented sieve bootstrap
procedure, estimating factors by cross-section averages, and present bootstrap pairwise estimates
of the proportions that are stationary1. The main contribution of this paper is empirical; using
an existing dataset and an approach recently proposed in the literature, we assess the evidence
for PPP in a rather diﬀerent way. We just present the central results in the paper. A supplement
containing a variety of other results is available on request.
There are a range of other issues in the PPP debate that we do not address. Taylor and
Taylor (2004) provide a recent survey. These issues include: the relative role of prices and
nominal exchange rates to adjustment (e.g. Cheung et al. 2004); non-linear adjustment (e.g.
Michael et al. 1997); behavioural models (e.g. De Grauwe and Grimaldi 2006); and the size
of the trade costs that may impede price adjustments (e.g. Anderson and van Wincoop 2004,
Novy 2005). Most tests of PPP use either nominal exchange rates and price diﬀerentials or real
exchange rates, as will be done here. Embedding the exchange rate equations in larger models
as done by Dees et al. (2006) and Garratt et al. (2006) seems to be more supportive of the PPP
hypothesis.
1Pesaran (2005a) provides a justiﬁcation for the use of cross-section averages as measures of unobserved factors
to deal with cross-section dependence.
2Section 2 describes the pairwise approach. Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 bootstraps
the proportions. Section 5 contains some concluding comments.
2 The Pairwise Approach
The pairwise approach adopted in this paper addresses diﬀerent questions from those posed by
IMRR and it may be useful to contrast them. IMRR conﬁne their attention to prices relative
to the US and, although they note that results relative to the UK were similar, their results
may not be robust to base country eﬀects. They emphasise estimation of speed of adjustment,
or half life, conditional on adjustment; rather than testing whether there is adjustment. Unlike
standard cases, the time series properties of relative prices mean that testing the null hypothesis
of no adjustment is not symmetrical with estimating the speed of adjustment and its conﬁdence
interval, conditional on adjustment taking place. This is because the distributions under the
null, no adjustment, and the alternative, adjustment, are diﬀerent. Thus the null hypothesis,
no adjustment, may not be rejected, yet under the alternative, the conﬁdence interval around
the speed of adjustment might not cover zero. They do various panel unit root tests with and
without trend concluding that the evidence for stationarity is stronger for the disaggregate data
than the aggregate data. However, their tests may reject the null that all the series have a unit
root if a proportion of the cases are stationary, even if the proportion that are stationary is
not large. Whereas the panel unit root tests are not informative about the proportion that are
stationary, the pairwise approach may be, because it estimates the proportion directly.
To deal with cross-section dependence they use the correlated common eﬀect (CCE) estimator
of Pesaran (2005b) which can be written:






δich∆qt−h + eict (1)
where qict is the relative price for good c in country i relative to US prices in dollars and qt is the
cross-section mean of the qict. For testing PPP, this approach is only valid when it is known that
the cross-section mean, qt, is stationary. Also the above speciﬁcation measures the adjustment
of qict t ot h em e a nr e a le x c h a n g er a t e ,qt, not to a constant, which is the usual interpretation
of PPP. It could be that qt is I(1), θic 6=0and λic > 0, so that qict and qt are both I(1) and
cointegrated. However, an I(1) real exchange rate is not consistent with the usual interpretation
of PPP.
The IMRR data covers monthly price indices for 19 goods, Pict for c =1 ,2,...,C, e.g. bread,
meat, and for aggregate prices Pit, ... for the 12, i,j =0 ,1,2,...,11 countries listed in Table
1, with their abbreviations (the US, country 0, and 11 European countries) and exchange rates
for country i against the US dollar Eit (domestic currency unit per dollar2). Getting consistent
cross-country data on disaggregated prices is quite diﬃcult, this is a well documented data set,
which has been carefully cleaned and widely used. The samples are mainly from 1981m1 to
1995m12, 180 observations, but a relatively short span. Some series are shorter, in particular the
Finland series start from 1985m1 and two series for particular goods in Portugal and three in
Finland are missing completely. Full details of the data coverage are given in IMRR Appendix 3.
Because the panel is unbalanced, when required we use Tijc to denote the sample size available
and Nc the number of countries available for a particular good, c.
Given data on Eit, the nominal bilateral exchange rate between country i and the US; Pit
the aggregate price index for country i at month t; and Pt the log of the US price index; then
2IMRR use dollars per domestic currency unit, but we converted it to follow the usual convention.
3the log real exchange rate for country i relative to the US is:
qit =l n (
EitPt
Pit
)=eit + pt − pit, (2)
using lower case letters to denote logarithms. Since Eijt = Eit/Ejt, the real exchange rate
between any other pair of countries i,j 6=0can be calculated as




We will refer to these qijt as pairwise real exchange rates, between i and j, where we will include
the US in the pairs, namely consider all i,j =0 ,1,...,N,f o ri 6= j. Similarly, given data on Pict
and Pjct, the price indices for good c in country i and j at date t, we can form the log relative
prices for the good c =1 ,2,...,C for country i relative to country j as:




qijct = qict − qjct. (5)
We consider tests using all possible N(N +1 ) /2 distinct pairs of real exchange rate qijt or
relative prices qijct amongst the N +1countries and estimate the proportion of the pairs that
are stationary, for the aggregate and each good, using a variety of tests. As argued in Pesaran
(2005a), the average rejection rate is likely to be more robust to cross-section dependence and the
possibility of an I(1) unobserved factor inducing that dependence than the alternative methods
available.
Consider the following factor model for the dollar real exchange rates:
qit = αi + γ0
ift + εit. (6)
There is an I(0) idiosyncratic component, εit and the common factors, ft, which induce cross-
sectional dependence and may be I(0) or I(1).T h e n
qijt =( αi − αj)+( γi − γj)0ft + εit − εjt, (7)
will be I(0) if either ft is I(0) or if ft is I(1) and non-cointegrated but γi = γj.
Consider an ADF test, where the null is a unit root, non-stationarity, HN, with lag order
p, applied to qijt,t=1 ,2,...,T. Let ZijT =1if ADFijT(p) <K T,p,α the critical value for an
ADF test of size α, such that limT→∞ Pr(ADFijT(p) <K T,p,α | HN)=α. The fraction of the











Even if the idiosyncratic components εit are independent across countries ZijT and ZikT will
not be independently distributed. However, Pesaran (2005a) shows that if the idiosyncratic
components are independent, under HN, Z
A
NT is a consistent estimator of α for large N and T.
Under the stationary alternative, HS, Z
A
NT converges to unity for large N and T. Similar results
apply to the KPSS test with the role of the null and alternative reversed. In that case Z
K
NT is
the proportion of cases where the stationary hypothesis, HS, is rejected.
4If HS holds then we would expect Z
K
NT to be close to the chosen size of the test and Z
A
NT to be
large. If HN holds then we would expect Z
K
NT to be large and Z
A
NT to be close to the size of the
test. When T is ﬁnite the proportions ZNT converges to αT, the empirical rejection frequency
of the underlying test for the appropriate null. The average rejection frequency converges to
αT as N →∞ . Increasing the panel dimension reduces the sampling variation of the estimated
proportions. A similar reduction in sampling variation can be achieved by increasing the number
of replications in a bootstrap experiment, a point we return to below. In principle, it would be
possible to develop a formal statistical test of whether the estimated proportion of rejections is
signiﬁcantly greater than the size of the test. In practice, the magnitude of the proportion of
rejections is of more economic interest.
As a ﬁnal preliminary it is worth considering the relation between the CCE estimator, the
pairwise approach, and tests of PPP using eﬀective real exchange rates. The eﬀective real





where wij is the share of country j in the trade (exports plus imports) of country i.T h i s i s
closely related to the qt used as a regressor in the CCE estimator by IMRR, which uses equal
weights rather than trade weights. It is also a weighted average of the pairwise real exchange
rates for country i. The eﬀective real rate of country i will be I(0) if all the pairwise rates of
country i are I(0) (given non-zero trade weights that add up to unity). The eﬀective real rate
will be I(1) if some of the pairwise rates are I(1).
To investigate their properties, eﬀective real rates were constructed for the twelve countries in
the sample using data on imports and exports from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. The
weights wij are the share for country j in the total trade of country i with all 11 countries in the
sample; using average trade ﬂows over the period 1987-1989, about the middle of the estimation
period. Details of their construction and full results are given in section 1 of a supplement that
is available on request. Table 2 summarises the results. It gives ADF statistics, both for the case
with just a constant and the case with constant and linear trend, where lag length is selected
by the AIC for a maximum of lag of 12. As one would expect from the literature, there is little
evidence against the unit root hypothesis. Belgium rejects at the 5% level in the intercept and
trend case, the UK at the 10% level in the intercept case. However, as noted above, this only
indicates that not all the pairwise rates are I(0). Therefore, we investigate the pairwise rates
directly.
3 Results of the Pairwise Tests
Conducting the tests requires a number of choices. We make these choices in a way that is likely
to be favourable to the PPP hypothesis, which is the hypothesis of interest. We assume that the
equilibrium real exchange rate is given by an intercept and trend. Results with just an intercept
are given in section 2 of the supplement. They showed fewer rejections of the unit root null as one
might expect. We use the standard ADF, the ADF-GLS of Elliot et al. (1996), and the ADF-WS
of Park and Fuller (1995). All three have the null of a unit root. The ADF-GLS and ADF-WS
are designed to have higher power than the standard ADF. We also use the KPSS (1992) test,
which has the null of stationarity. Whichever test we use, we will present the results as the
proportion of cases that reject the null of that test. Since the data are monthly, we examined
both the seasonally adjusted and unadjusted price series. Seasonal adjustment did not make a
lot of diﬀerence to the results. Details on the method of seasonal adjustment and the results
5on seasonally adjusted data are given in section 3 of the supplement. In ADF type tests, we
allow for a lag length, p,u pt o1 2a n du s eb o t hA I Ca n dS B Ct os e l e c tl a gl e n g t h . F o rK P S S
tests we use three window sizes: 0.75T1/3, which is standard in econometric applications; the
much larger window size of 2T1/2, often used in the time series literature; and the average of
the two. The KPSS test relies on estimating the spectral density at zero frequency to correct
for serially correlated errors, which is subject to a considerable degree of uncertainty. To avoid
size distortions one needs a large window size, but this is likely to reduce power. Considering a
number of window sizes allows us to investigate this trade oﬀ. We consider the full sample of 12
countries, with a maximum of 66 pairwise comparisons across a maximum of 19 goods (data on
prices of some goods for some countries do not exist). We use a 10% size. The appropriate critical
values for each of the ADF type tests were calculated by Monte Carlo using 10,000 replications
for each p and T. The critical values are given in section 4 of the supplement.
The fraction of pairs (out of a maximum of 66) that reject the null hypothesis for the aggregate
CPI and the 19 subcategories of goods prices are given in Table 3. The results are very sensitive
to treatment of dynamics, much more so than output, considered in Pesaran (2005a). This is
not surprising, given that the PPP data are monthly, whereas the output series are annual. The
results are also sensitive to the model selection criterion used to determine the lag length and
to the particular unit root test being considered. The rejection rates can diﬀer substantially
between the six ADF type procedures (3 tests, 2 methods to select lag length). For instance,
rejection rates range from 1.82% to 16.36% for rents and 22.73% to 68.18% for fruits. In 13 of
the 20 cases ADF-AIC had the highest fraction of rejections; in one case jointly with one other
procedure and in two cases jointly with two other procedures. This is somewhat surprising given
that the ADF-AIC is not the procedure one might have expected to have the highest power. The
ADF-WS-AIC never has the maximum rejection rate, but the ADF-WS-SBC has the maximum
rejection rate in four cases. For the ADF-GLS and the ADF-WS the SBC variant has higher
rejection frequencies than the AIC variant. In the case with just an intercept, reported in section
2 of the supplement, ADF-WS has the highest rejection rates and it seems that including a trend
reduces the power of the ADF-WS relative to the other tests. The rejection rate is below the
size, 10%, in 28 of the 120 cases and above 20% in 30 of the 120 cases. Overall, although the
rejection rates are not high, they are very unlikely to have been generated by a process in which
all the relative prices had unit roots.
The pattern noted by IMRR is apparent: the fraction of rejections by all three ADF tests is
higher on average for the commodities than it is for the aggregate CPI. Whereas the proportion
of rejections using the aggregate CPI varies from 6% to 14%, depending on test; the averages
over the 19 categories range from 13% to 21%. This is also true in the case with just an intercept.
The strongest case for PPP is fruits. When the lag length is chosen by the SBC all three ADF
tests reject the unit root in fruits prices in over half the cases. However, when the lag length is
chosen by the AIC, the rejection rate is smaller. This pattern can also be seen in the case with
just an intercept: when SBC is used the unit root is rejected in around half the cases, but this
proportion is much lower using AIC. Average lag length and degree of serial correlation seem to
diﬀer by commodity. Details are given in section 5 of the supplement.
The KPSS test shows a similar sensitivity to dynamic speciﬁcation. When the window is set
to the standard size of 0.75T1/3, the null of stationarity is rejected over 95% of the time in all
cases, except for fruit, tobacco and domestic appliances. For two commodities the stationary
null is rejected in 100% of the cases. However, with the larger window size of 2T1/2,t h er e j e c t i o n
rate falls sharply as one would expect and stationarity is only rejected a quarter of the pairwise
tests, on average. Using a window size which is the average of the two, gives a rejection rate
of 55%. In the case with just an intercept, rejection rates are slightly lower with the standard
window and slightly higher with the large window. Asymptotic critical values are used for the
6KPSS test, so there may be more risk of size distortion.
Our results conﬁrm IMRR’s conclusion that the disaggregate data on individual commodities
provide more evidence for adjustment to PPP than the aggregate CPI data. In addition the
proportion of rejections is substantially higher than the size of the test, providing quite strong
evidence against unit roots in all series. The fact that the proportion of rejections is still quite
small may reﬂect the low power of these tests. Although T = 180 is quite large, the actual time
span covered is relatively short and the dynamics complicated. In small samples the ADF critical
values are sensitive to p and T and in practice p is unknown. In addition, there may be sampling
variation in the estimated rejection frequencies because N, the number of countries, is small.
To try to improve the small sample properties we use a factor augmented sieve bootstrap. This
involves estimating a model which captures the factor structure and serial correlation patterns
of the data, then bootstrapping the rejection rates.
4 Factor Augmented Sieve Bootstrap Estimates
It is now standard in the literature to interpret the cross-section dependence in terms of a factor
model and such a model is the basis of the CCE estimation approach utilized by IMRR . Therefore
we estimate the parameters of the underlying factor model directly and use these estimates to
bootstrap the pairwise rejection rates. Whereas in some contexts the factors themselves are of
interest, here they are nuisance parameters which induce cross-section dependence, but need to
be controlled for if we are to get good estimates of the proportion of rejections.
4.1 Factor Augmented Model
The ﬁrst stage is to estimate time varying common factors, at the aggregate level (one) and at








Using equal weights corresponds to those used in the CCE estimator, though estimates of factors
tend not to be very sensitive to choice of the weights. Then ADF(sc) regressions are estimated
for ¯ qct,
∆¯ qct =ˆ μc + ˆ φc¯ qc,t−1 +
sc X
`=1
ˆ ξc`∆¯ qc,t−` +ˆ ect, (11)
where the lag-order sc is chosen by AIC. The null of non-stationarity could not be rejected for ¯ qt
or any of the ¯ qct. The results of ADF tests are given in Table 4. This suggests that the common
factors used in the IMRR CCE estimators may well be I(1). Where ˆ φc > 0,w es e tˆ φc =0and
ˆ μc =0to avoid explosive factors. Given the uncertainty about whether there are I(1) common
factors, we construct the bootstrap under two assumptions: (a) not imposing unit roots on the
factors and using the estimated ˆ φc or (b) imposing unit roots on the factors on the basis of the
pretest results and setting ˆ φc =0 , for all c. This allows us to assess the eﬀect of any downward
Tc-bias in ˆ φc.
In the second stage, qict i sr e g r e s s e do nu n i t y ,¯ qct and ¯ qt for each combination of (i,c) to
obtain the estimated model
qict =ˆ αic +ˆ γic1¯ qct +ˆ γic2¯ qt +ˆ εict. (12)
7The coeﬃcients on the factors are often large, elasticities of one or greater and there is some
tendency for the two factors to have opposite signs. Estimates are given in section 6 of the
supplement. There is also a tendency for the neigbouring European countries to have similar
values for the factor coeﬃcients. A number of pairs of European countries have goods where
coeﬃcients of both factor loadings diﬀer by 0.1 or less. Details of these pairs are given in section
7 of the supplement.
To allow for the serial correlation in ˆ εict ,A D F ( sic) regressions are estimated for ˆ εict, for each
(i,c),
∆ˆ εict = b ˆ ηic + b ˆ λicˆ εic,t−1 +
sic X
`=1
b ˆ ψic`∆ˆ εic,t−` +ˆ υict, (13)
where the lag-order sic are chosen by AIC. Again, when b ˆ λic > 0,w er e s t r i c tb ˆ λic ≡ 0 and b ˆ ηic ≡ 0,
to avoid explosive outcomes.
4.2 The Bootstrap Procedure
In the third stage, data are generated on qict based on the estimates of equations (11), (12), and
(13). The residuals of (11) and (13) are drawn with replacement.
Step 1: (a) The rth replication of commodity speciﬁc common factor, ¯ q
(r)
ct ,a n dt h e i rc r o s s
section average ¯ q
(r)
t , are generated as
¯ q
(r)

















ct ,t =1 ,2,...,T,
where r =1 ,2,...,R, estimates and lag-orders sc is deﬁn e di n( 1 1 ) ,e
(r)
ct are random
draws with replacement from {ˆ ect}T







(¯ qc,1, ¯ qc,2,...,¯ qc,sc+1) are used.
(b) Step 1(a) uses the estimated ˆ φc but pretesting indicated that one could not reject the
hypothesis ˆ φc =0 , therefore the second set of ¯ q
(r)
ct , are generated imposing unit roots on












ct ,t =1 ,2,...,T;c =1 ,2,...,C. (15)
the steps below are followed for both measures of ¯ q
(r)
ct
Step 2: The rth replication of qict is generated as
q
(r)
ict =ˆ αic +ˆ γic1¯ q
(r)




ict, i =1 ,2,...,N;t =1 ,2,...,T;r =1 ,2,...,R, (16)
where estimates are obtained from (12), and ε
(r)
ict are generated using (13) such that
ε
(r)










8where b ˆ ηic, b λic, b ˆ ψic`, sic are estimated in (13), υ
(r)








ic0)=( ˆ εic,1,ˆ εic,2,...,ˆ εic,sic+1) are
used.







for which the null hypothesis is rejected by the test, F
(r)
c .






The ADF-GLS and ADF-WS versions are done similarly. We set T = 180 (balanced), Nc =
12, C =1 9as in the full sample.
4.3 Bootstrapped Results
The bootstrapped rejection rates for the case where unit roots were not imposed on the com-
modity factors are given in Table 5; those where the unit root was imposed on the factors are
given in Table 6. As noted above, imposing a unit root on the common commodity factors does








=( ˆ αic − ˆ αjc)+(ˆ γic1 − ˆ γjc1)¯ q
(r)







then if the factor loadings are similar, (ˆ γic1−ˆ γjc1) ≈ (ˆ γic2−ˆ γjc2) ≈ 0, the I(1) component drops











As one might expect, the rejection fractions for ADF type tests are higher for the case where
unit roots are not imposed on the factors than for the case where unit roots are imposed. However,
bootstrapped rejection rates for both cases are higher than the rejection rates for the original
data given in Table 3. Not imposing unit roots gives a range for the rejection frequencies of 36%
to 49% , imposing unit roots, 26% to 32%. Many features of the original data are maintained,
e.g. fruits has a very high rejection rate and there are positive correlations between the actual
and boostrapped rejection rates. The dispersion among the six procedures is much smaller in the
bootstrapped data than in the original data: one does not get such large diﬀerences in rejection
frequencies between tests. This may be because of the reduction in sampling variation. Also
unlike the original data, where the standard ADF had the highest average rejection frequency,
with the bootstrapped data the ADF-GLS and ADF-WS have higher rejection frequencies than
the standard ADF, thus being consistent with the expected power characteristics. With the
original data, ADF-AIC had slightly higher rejection frequencies than ADF-SBC, while for the
other two tests the SBC variant had slightly higher rejection frequencies. With the bootstrapped
data, the AIC variant always has higher rejection frequencies than the SBC variant.
With the KPSS test the position is not so straightforward. Using the standard window, the
proportion of rejections of stationarity is much lower in the bootstrap data than the original data,
consistent with the ADF results. However, with the large window the proportion of rejections of
stationarity is higher with the bootstrapped data than with the original data.
95 Conclusions
In this paper we suggest a new procedure for testing PPP, which avoids a number of diﬃculties
associated with the procedures used by IMRR, whose data we use. We test the null hypothesis
of no adjustment towards PPP using a variety of ADF type tests and the null hypothesis of
adjustment using KPSS tests with a variety of window sizes. We use both aggregate CPI data
and 19 disaggregate relative prices for individual goods and test all possible N(N +1 ) /2 pairs
of real exchange rate pairs across the N +1countries. This allows us to estimate the proportion
of the pairs that reject the null for the particular test. This approach is invariant to base
country eﬀects and the proportion that are non-stationary is consistently estimated under the
null hypothesis despite the cross-section dependence of the pairwise tests. The rejection rates on
ADF type tests are higher than the size of the test, which is the rejection frequency one would
expect if all the relative prices had unit roots. Thus the results provide some evidence in favour
of PPP. In line with IMRR’s ﬁndings, the rejection rates are higher on average for the individual
commodity prices than for the aggregate price indices. The rejection rates seem sensitive to
dynamic speciﬁcation and because the number of countries is relatively small they are subject
to sampling variability. In addition, the rejection rates of the diﬀerent types of ADF test do
not match their known power characteristics. The results from the KPSS test are inconclusive
because they are so sensitive to the lag-window used, and there may be size distortions because
of the use of asymptotic critical values.
To deal with small sample problems and possible residual cross section dependencies, we
estimate the parameters of a factor model from the data and bootstrap the rejection rates. We
estimate the global and commodity speciﬁc factors that induce the cross-sectional dependence.
We cannot reject unit roots in these factors so we conduct the analysis both by not imposing
unit roots in the factors and using the estimated coeﬃcients, and by imposing unit roots in the
factors. The bootstrapped estimates of the rejection frequencies are more stable, showing less
variation between types of test, and the rejection frequencies of the diﬀerent procedures match
their known power characteristics. Also the bootstrapped rejection frequencies of ADF type tests
are higher than those obtained from the original data. In the original data the averages over
commodities ranged from 13% to 21% depending on unit root test, for the bootstrapped data
they range from 36% to 49% when a unit root is not imposed on the factors and 26% to 32%
when a unit root is imposed on the factors. These results provide evidence against the null of no
PPP and evidence that rejection of this null is stronger with disaggregate data. It also suggests
that sampling variability may cause a downward bias in the rejection frequencies. Of course,
despite its advantages, this procedure cannot compensate for the fact that the short span of the
data used may lower the power of the test. However, long-span data at a disaggregate level is
not available and there are issues of potential structural instability. Nevertheless, the pairwise
procedure does deal with base-country eﬀects, aggregation, and by using the factor augmented
sieve bootstrap procedure it can also potentially deal with the small sample eﬀects, and possible
residual cross section dependencies.
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Table 2: ADF Test Results for Real Eﬀective Exchange Rates
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Notes: Reported statistics are based on ADF regressions with maximum AIC values, using a maximum lag of
12. The ﬁrst column is the case with just an intercept, the second with an intercept and a linear trend. Superscript
*s i g n i ﬁes the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at10% level. ** signiﬁes the null hypothesis of a unit root
is rejected at 5% level. The critical values are simulated with 10,000 replications, based on ADF regressions with
the same lag order and sample size as of the underlying ADF regression based on actual data.
12Table 3: Fractions of Pairs of qijct for Which the Null Hypothesis is Rejected at
10% Signiﬁcance Level - With an Intercept and Linear Trend, for all 12 Countries
Lag Order Chosen by AIC Lag Order Chosen by SBC KPSS
ADF ADF-GLS ADF-WS ADF ADF-GLS ADF-WS 0.75T1/3 2T1/2 av
CPI 13.64 6.06 9.09 13.64 13.64 12.12 96.97 31.82 60.61
Subcategories
Bread 13.64 13.64 12.12 13.64 7.58 10.61 98.48 22.73 53.03
Meat 21.21 18.18 19.70 16.67 19.70 18.18 98.48 28.79 65.15
Dairy 16.67 12.12 13.64 15.15 10.61 13.64 95.45 34.85 62.12
Fruits 28.79 22.73 31.82 59.09 51.52 68.18 90.91 24.24 56.06
Tobacco 40.91 15.15 22.73 42.42 19.70 25.76 93.94 16.67 56.06
Alcohol 19.70 16.67 18.18 15.15 12.12 13.64 96.97 28.79 66.67
Clothing 25.76 18.18 16.67 22.73 15.15 15.15 96.97 18.18 46.97
Footwear 21.21 6.06 7.58 16.67 4.55 4.55 95.45 28.79 50.00
Rents 16.36 7.27 10.91 12.73 1.82 3.64 98.18 34.55 52.73
Fuel 27.27 23.64 27.27 32.73 30.91 34.55 96.36 30.91 61.82
Furnit. 27.27 5.45 14.55 21.82 5.45 10.91 96.36 21.82 41.82
Dom. Appl. 27.27 10.91 16.36 14.55 5.45 9.09 94.55 12.73 36.36
Vehicles 21.21 18.18 19.70 16.67 19.70 21.21 95.45 30.30 46.97
Pub. Transp 13.64 7.58 9.09 18.18 9.09 9.09 95.45 33.33 51.52
Comm. 7.58 12.12 7.58 7.58 9.09 4.55 100.00 22.73 56.06
Sound 23.64 14.55 20.00 27.27 30.91 30.91 96.36 27.27 69.09
Leisure 13.64 7.58 10.61 12.12 7.58 10.61 98.48 33.33 68.18
Books 22.73 15.15 19.70 18.18 16.67 16.67 95.45 18.18 42.42
Hotels 18.18 7.58 4.55 19.70 10.61 9.09 100.00 40.91 69.70
Average 21.40 13.30 15.93 21.21 15.17 17.37 96.49 26.79 55.41
Notes: ADF is the Augmented Dicky-Fuller unit root test, ADF-GLS is Elliot et al. (1996) test, ADF-WS is
Park and Fuller’s (1995) weighted symmetric test. Unit root tests are conducted at 10% signiﬁcance level for
Nc(Nc +1 ) /2 distinct pairs of qijct, i 6= j, for each commodity c, and augmentation orders are chosen by AIC
a n dS B Co fA D Fr e g r e s s i o nf r o ma u g m e n t a t i o no r d e r sp =0 ,1,...,12, then the fraction of the rejected pairs over
Nc(Nc +1 ) /2 are computed. Critical values are diﬀerent for Tijc and augmentation orders p.T h e w i n d o w t o
compute KPSS statistics is shown in the second row, the ﬁnal column av uses a window of (0.75T1/3 +2T1/2)/2
. The ‘Average’ located at the bottom raw of the table is a simple average of fractions over all the commodities
(except CPI).
13Table 4: ADF Unit Root Test Results for ¯ qt and ¯ qct
Tc With an Intercept
With an Intercept
and a Trend
ADF 10%CV sc ADF 10%CV sc
¯ qt 180 −1.498 −2.578 2 −1.678 −3.125 2
¯ qct
Bread 180 −1.379 −2.578 2 −1.115 −3.125 2
Meat 180 −1.552 −2.578 2 −1.424 −3.125 2
Dairy 180 −1.295 −2.603 1 −1.019 −3.144 1
Fruits 180 −2.110 −2.559 12 −2.156 −3.082 12
Tobacco 180 −0.919 −2.603 1 −2.997 −3.144 1
Alcohol 180 −1.045 −2.572 4 −1.456 −3.122 4
Clothing 180 −1.352 −2.603 1 −1.243 −3.144 1
Footwear 180 −1.335 −2.603 1 −1.233 −3.144 1
Rents 180 −1.193 −2.603 1 −1.606 −3.144 1
Fuel 180 −1.998 −2.583 3 −2.520 −3.126 3
Furnit. 166 0.133 −2.586 1 −2.178 −3.144 1
Dom. Appl. 166 0.117 −2.586 1 −2.029 −3.144 1
Vehicles 180 −1.411 −2.578 2 −1.424 −3.125 2
Pub. Transp 180 −1.595 −2.578 2 −1.720 −3.125 2
Comm. 180 −2.392 −2.578 2 −2.901 −3.125 2
Sound 180 −1.527 −2.578 2 −0.626 −3.125 2
Leisure 177 −1.537 −2.578 2 −1.617 −3.125 2
Books 177 −1.320 −2.578 2 −0.851 −3.125 2
Hotels 177 −2.074 −2.559 12 −1.971 −3.082 12
Notes: The third and sixth columns of the table report ADF statistics, which are the t-ratios of ˆ φc in the ADF
regressions ∆¯ qct =ˆ μc + ˆ δct + ˆ φc¯ qc,t−1 +
Ssc
`=1
ˆ ξc`∆¯ qc,t−` +ˆ ect, c =1 ,2,...,C, t =1 4 ,15,...,Tc,w h e r et h el a g
augmentation sc is chosen by AIC from ` =1 ,2,...,12. The ADF 10% critical values, which depend on Tc and
sc, are obtained via stochastic simulations with 10,000 replications.
14Table 5: Average Fractions of Pairs for Which the Null is Rejected, Based on
2000 Replications of Bootstrapped Data. R e g r e s s i o n sW i t ha nI n t e r c e p ta n dU n i t
R o o t sn o tI m p o s e do nt h eC o m m o d i t yF a c t o r s
Lag Order Chosen by AIC Lag Order Chosen by SBC KPSS
ADF ADF-GLS ADF-WS ADF ADF-GLS ADF-WS 0.75T1/3 2T1/2 av
Subcategories
Bread 37.79 43.16 49.23 30.86 37.52 41.36 74.02 20.19 34.47
Meat 48.56 62.51 68.64 40.22 56.71 61.33 67.39 13.79 27.03
Dairy 32.56 47.97 49.27 25.39 42.38 42.09 76.86 21.36 36.39
Fruits 64.03 64.07 76.48 82.73 82.05 90.05 36.96 8.16 15.92
Tobacco 47.65 44.90 56.23 43.57 42.62 52.67 72.52 18.53 32.11
Alcohol 26.06 27.42 32.22 23.35 24.47 28.29 61.13 23.73 34.73
Clothing 29.21 39.25 41.03 28.81 39.72 41.77 82.04 29.09 44.71
Footwear 36.05 44.85 46.78 28.32 40.39 40.99 76.81 27.67 41.23
Rents 29.66 39.22 42.61 20.23 31.60 33.14 76.15 18.92 33.99
Fuel 45.61 42.84 52.08 41.48 40.40 48.35 58.08 20.37 29.79
Furnit. 37.41 36.05 39.90 41.18 39.34 43.41 80.27 42.43 55.67
Dom. Appl. 37.75 39.57 44.65 42.05 43.48 48.13 79.51 37.99 51.76
Vehicles 23.98 34.20 35.50 17.18 26.65 26.07 82.14 25.36 41.95
Pub. Transp 29.75 34.22 39.00 26.53 31.19 34.94 80.61 27.40 42.55
Comm. 34.35 24.78 35.65 28.96 22.78 30.67 79.36 28.57 42.89
Sound 59.03 58.63 70.37 62.18 62.23 72.86 61.56 15.51 26.33
Leisure 21.92 37.08 42.16 23.97 36.76 43.29 67.47 21.03 34.68
Books 29.82 41.77 43.24 22.41 35.38 35.33 78.61 24.37 39.65
Hotels 53.76 67.50 70.84 58.25 71.82 75.55 63.46 15.22 26.54
Average 38.16 43.68 49.26 36.19 42.50 46.86 71.31 23.14 36.44
Notes: This table reports the average fractions, R−1 SR
r=1 F
(r)
c , c =1 ,2,...,C,w h e r eF
(r)







jct,i nt h erth replication for which the null hypothesis is rejected by the tests. The rth
replication of qict is generated as q
(r)
ict =ˆ αic+ˆ γic1¯ q
(r)




ict, i =1 ,2,...,N c;t =1 ,2,...,T;r =1 ,2,...,R,
where the estimates ˆ αic, ˆ γic1, ˆ γic2, ˆ εict are obtained from the regression of qict on unity, ¯ qct and ¯ qt for each
combination of (i,c), ε
(r)
ict are generated based on the estimates of ADF regression of ˆ εict and random draws of its
residuals with replacement. ¯ q
(r)
ct is generated based on the estimates of ADF regression of ¯ qct and random draws
of its residuals with replacement. ¯ q
(r)
t ≡ C−1 SC
c=1 ¯ q
(r)
ct . T =1 8 0 ,a n dR = 2000. See Section 4 for the details of
bootstrap procedure. See also notes to Table 3.
15Table 6: Average Fractions of Pairs for Which the Null is Rejected, Based on
2000 Replications of Bootstrapped Data. R e g r e s s i o n sW i t ha nI n t e r c e p ta n dU n i t
Roots Imposed on the Commodity Factors
Lag Order Chosen by AIC Lag Order Chosen by SBC KPSS
ADF ADF-GLS ADF-WS ADF ADF-GLS ADF-WS 0.75T1/3 2T1/2 av
Subcategories
Bread 27.41 27.19 31.24 22.94 24.09 26.86 83.95 39.77 54.10
Meat 31.10 30.07 36.72 26.66 27.01 32.65 82.43 40.55 53.90
Dairy 23.03 27.26 28.78 18.47 23.84 24.28 86.41 42.57 57.29
Fruits 37.88 41.56 44.15 53.84 54.99 58.63 68.14 35.63 48.33
Tobacco 41.10 38.20 46.57 37.76 36.42 43.63 78.74 30.41 44.22
Alcohol 21.37 19.96 23.84 19.65 18.44 21.33 65.53 34.49 44.62
Clothing 22.65 25.79 27.63 22.57 26.19 28.29 88.12 43.37 58.40
Footwear 28.78 32.75 35.22 22.54 29.01 30.32 83.90 41.03 54.23
Rents 23.14 23.53 26.90 15.85 18.41 20.23 84.04 38.93 52.43
Fuel 26.98 27.94 30.63 25.03 26.41 28.33 70.90 37.73 48.30
Furnit. 37.15 35.72 39.65 40.96 39.05 43.23 80.48 42.81 55.78
Dom. Appl. 36.15 37.41 42.24 40.56 41.33 45.98 81.03 39.90 53.41
Vehicles 17.95 18.27 20.35 13.40 14.05 14.68 88.59 42.20 57.24
Pub. Transp 19.85 19.43 21.68 18.68 18.16 20.10 89.08 44.21 59.37
Comm. 20.29 24.99 26.84 17.35 22.73 23.80 86.98 41.12 56.39
Sound 40.90 35.65 44.60 44.57 39.28 47.90 78.07 37.08 49.84
Leisure 13.21 14.79 20.51 13.96 13.88 22.84 75.88 40.60 52.69
Books 21.91 24.88 26.94 16.68 20.49 21.42 86.84 42.67 56.88
Hotels 23.68 22.09 26.31 26.00 24.52 29.12 87.40 44.98 59.13
Average 27.08 27.76 31.62 26.18 27.28 30.72 81.40 40.00 53.50
Notes: See notes to Tables 3 and 5. The simulation design is identical to that of Table 5, except ¯ q
(r)
ct is restricted
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